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ABSTRACT

The present study examined the effects of background
or contextual variables on human social causal judgements.

Modern conditioning and attribution research principles were
combined to investigate social analogues of acquisition and
blocking of causal judgements. As part of the masking task,

subjects were asked to play the role of a supervisor and
evaluate the efficacy of an employee evaluation system.
Fictional worker(s) and a company's production goals were
presented to subjects to evaluate the workers'
effectiveness in causing the company's level of production.
A simple repeated measures analysis were performed on the
worker causal ratings, and acquisition effects were not

found; however, a familiar acquisition function was revealed
when it was discovered that subjects were responding to the
varying levels of the company's production.

A 3 X 6

Manova performed on the target worker's causal ratings did

not evidence blocking.

Alternative explanations for the

unanticipated findings, and implications for further
research were discussed.

Heuristically, this study enhances

attribution research such that the basic psychological
processes involved in clinical judgement may be compared and
understood in a contextual situation with those involved in

everyday social judgement.
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INTRODUCTION

One purposeful way that people make sense out

of the world is through identifying causal connections and
by making causal judgements.

Events, changes in state,

and changes in properties are all explained and thus
understood by attribution to their respective causes.
The concept of causation is just as fundamental to
human understanding as are concepts of object, space,
time, quantity, and logic. Perhaps this may be the

reason why many Western philosophers have dealt in a
systematic way with the ontological and epistemological
aspects of causation.

Western ideologies have generally influenced
contemporary thinking on causation and this influence has
contributed to the development of an area of research and
theory in social psychology known as attribution theory

(Bunge, 1979; Duval, 1983; Einhorn & Hogarth, 1986;

Hewstone, 1989; Schulz, 1982). Of monumental interest in the

movement of Western philosophical thinking was a period in

the seventeenth century dominated by the British
Associationists. The British Associationists viewed human

knowledge as a product of impressions processed through our
senses. Simple ideas were viewed as irreducible elements of

sensory experience, and complex ideas were thought to be
1

built up from simple ideas by a series of learned
associations. For example, David Hume's (1962/1739)
Treatise of Human Nature, suggested that associative

learning and causal judgements depended upon a

deterministic process. He

developed several rules for

causal association: 1) spatiotemporal contiauitv. or causes

and effects must be contiguous in

space and time; 2)

temporal priority, or causes must occur prior to

their

effects; and 3) constant union, or causes and effects must
occur together.

Another British

Associationist, John Stuart Mill

(1872/1973), suggested from his System of Logic that causes
"...are the sum total of conditions positive and negative
taken together....which being realized, the consequence in

variably follows" (Davidson, 1967, pg. 692.) Mill argued
that what people ordina:rily call the cause is one of these

conditions, arbitrarily selected, which becomes inaccurately
labelled as "the cause."

Although attribution theory has been defined as
the study of perceived causation where attribution

refers to the perception or inference of cause (Kelley

& Michela, 1980), several researchers have suggested
that "attribution theory" is actually a loose term

standing for a general perspective and/or problem
rather than a theory (Buss, 1978; Medcof, 1990; Medcof,
2

Kelley & Michela, 1980). Moreover, attributional
conoepts are at the center of contemporary cognitive

psychology and have been a major target of critical
analyses (Harvey & Weary, 1981). The present research
seeks to

develop and test a conditioning model which

extends research on causal attribution by employing a
research approach which Neal Miller (1959) called an

"extension of liberalized S-R lea:rning theory".

Utilizing the Rescorla-Wagner model (1972), I
tested several novel predictions from Rescorla and
Wagner•s theory. More specifically, as part of a
larger

program of learning

research, I

examined acquisition effects and a phenomenon called
"blocking" (Kamin, 1968; 1969). Results from the
present research can be used to demonstrate that in

accordance with contemporary psychological thinking,

including both learning theories (e.g. RescorlaWagner, 1972) and cognitive social theories (e.g. Jones

& Davis, 1965; Kelley, 1973), causal judgements reflect
a predictable selective mechanism. From a broader

perspective, the present study can serve as a heuristic

device to generate additional hypotheses and

experimental studies pertaining to context effects in
human causal judgement.

CONTEMPORARY CAUSAL ATTRIBUTION RESEARCH

Theoretical and empirical research on attributional
processes have been a major focus of research in social

psychology. In fact, Kelley and Michela (1980) reported over

900 publications relevant to attributional processes between
1970 and 1980. Harvey and Weary (1984) found another 400 to
500 relevant papers published between 1978 to 1984.

Perhaps one of the many reasons why social psychologists
examine this area of research is that attributional

processes are closely connected to other social

psychological phenomena. For example, our understanding of
the causes of behavior are crucial mediators of our actions

in the social world. Moreover, our reactions to other

people, like altruism, attraction and conformity, depend on
our judgements of the causes underlying another person's
behavior.

Regularitv vs Generative Theory. It can be said that
the development and construction of theory is built upon a

historical background in methodology and philosophy. Two
opposing positions have risen in the treatment of causation.

First, regularity-based theories (like Kelley's covariation
model and associative learning models) of causation follow

from the philosophical principles of logical positivism
(Nagel, 1961). Originally, the regularity

view of causation

was influenced by the work of Hume (1739/1960), who argued
4

that human observers chnnot in principle validate the
existence of real causal connections, but only observe the

repetitive, regular occurrences of independent events. Hume
maintained that observers interpret phenomena in terms of
one event causing another to the extent that any or all of

three conditions occur (i.e. spatiotemporal contiguity,
temporal priority, and constant union). Contemporary
modifications of the regularity view emphasize notions of

necessary and sufficient conditions, and a conditionship
analysis of causal connections. This involves the
specification of an event occurring either under necessary

or sufficient conditions, or both, governing the
relationship of two eivents.

Generative theories, on the other hand, argue that
causes actually generate or produce the effect. An example

of a generative cause would be an automobile accident which
ultimately produces the effect. According to Schultz (1982),

generative theories originated from early Western
philosophers (i.e. Kant, 1781/1965), with psychological
research on causal inference and attribution being

primarily influehced by regularity-based theories.
And, the work proposed here follows a "regularity" based

position. Indeed, Einhbrn and Hogarth (1986) have argued a
similar case by stating that attribution theory researchers
have followed Kelley (1967) in emphasizing Mill's (1872)
■ 5-'

criti^ria of concomitant variation and method of difference.

The rule of "concomitant variation" argues that inferences

about the cause determining the effect are more probable
when other competing explanations are ruled out. And Mill's
"method of difference" states that if an effect is not

observed, then the cause will not be present.
Although research on attribution processes has
continued to grow over the last decade, it has been
argued that there still remains no well accepted set of

assumptions or hypotheses, nor general conclusions that fit
together in a logical network (Weary, Stanley, & Harvey,
1989). However, the vast majority of attribution studies

have developed from the theoretical perspectives of
researchers like Heider (1958), Jones and Davis (1965) and
Kelley (1967, 1973). The commonalities between these three

theories include the following themes: 1) mediation between
stimulus and response; 2) active and constructive causal
interpretation; 3) and the perspective of the naive

perceiver or lay person (Taylor, 1981). Interestingly, they
also share a concern with common-sense explanations and

answers to the perceiver•s questions about why events occur,
or about a person's dispositions. Since the major focus
of contemporary research has stemmed from Heider (1958),

Jones and Davis (1965) and Kelley (1967), a brief review of
their major contributions follows.
6

Surprisingly, the first psychological study on

causality did not begin in social psychology, but developed
from the investigations of Jean Piaget and

A. E. Michotte.

Piaget (1930) examined the origin of the idea of causality

in children and how children used causal language. Michotte
(1946), who was influenced by a Gestalt psychological

perspective, studied the perception of causality through the
movement and collision of geometrical shapes. Michotte

argued that it was possible to experience phenomenal

causality directly, but only if the perceiver's total
impression of causality was not dissected into pieces by the
investigator. This and similar ideas from the Gestalt

perspective influenced Fritz Heider's (1958, 1973) thinking
regarding causality in the field social psychology.
Fritz Heider "Dispositional Properties". Heider's

contributions to attribution theory include his study of the
processes and variables involved in how people make causal

attributions (Weary, Stanley, & Harvey, 1989). Initially,
Heider (1958) was curious about the processes by which an
untrained observer makes sense out of the actions of others.

He suggested that ordinary people operate like "naive

scientists" when

making attributions. More specifically, he

argued that people observe an action

and then, in an

analytical way, they attempt to find the connections among
various causes and effects. In searching for these
7

connections, Heider applied the term "dispositional
properties" which dispose objects and events to manifest
themselves in certain ways and conditions. Heider further
believed that these dispositional properties are the

invariances which make for a more or less predictable,
stable, controllable world (Heider 1958, pg. 80).

Heider also suggested that people are not simply
content to register the observances surrounding them, but
they refer to the invariances in their environment. The

underlying causes of events (like the motives of other
people) are the invariances of the environment that
are relevant to the individual. This observation fostered

one of HeiderVs many theoretical statements: scientific

psychology could be studied from a common sense approach.

Put more simply, Heider's (1958) insights suggested an
analogy between naive causal analyses and experimental
methods because both presume a regularity in events
occurring in nature.

Heider (1958) suggested that a person's ability to
control the environment depends on the recognition of causal

relationships. In other words, to negotiate the external
world it is advantageous and even essential to understand

which specific events are causing what particular effects.
Similarly, Kelley (1973) stated that "causal attribution
identifies the causes of certain effects and forms the basis
8

for decisions about how to act in order to bring about the
continuance or discontinuance of those effects [p. 127]."

Notions of personal control and responsibility for outcomes
are closely related to the philosophical ideologies of both
critical realists (Harre, 1972) and contemporary learning
theorists (Garcia, 1968; Seligman, 1970). For example, the

critical realists view looking for causes (i.e., invariance
seeking action) as biolbgically adaptive and therefore may
be a part of human genetic makeup. Some learning theorists

support a similar notion in terms of an innate biological

mechanism located in the organism's central nervous system
which functions in the promotion of specific associations
biologically relevant to the organism's survival (AKA innate

releasing mechanisms). It may be possible that humans are
biologically or perhaps socio-logically prepared to
associate certain causes and certain effects more readily
than others (See Kuhn, 1993). While Heider (1958)

acknowledged that "intentionality" was important to the

understanding of personal causation, Jones and Davis (1965)
extended this concept by attempting to formalize how

individuals make inferences about a person's intentions and,
in turn, dispositions.
Jones and Davis "Gorrespondent Inference".

Jones and

Davis (1965) developed a hypothesis-testing theory known as
"Correspondent Inference". Basically, their theory is
9'■

concerned with factors that influence an observer's

attribution of intent and disposition to another person.

However, it does not explain how someone understands
his/her own dispositions and intentions (Weary, Stanley, &
Harvey, 1989).
Jones and Davis describe a correspondent inference as
ah inference about an individual's intentions and

dispositions that directly results from or corresponds to

his/her behaviors. For example. Professor Kenny makes a
sarcastic remark to one of his students named Fredrika,

leading to some emotional discomfort on her part.

We may

infer that Professor Kenny is hostile toward Fredrika and

intends to abuse her verbally. In this example, the

perceiVer's attribution of Professor Kenny's intent follows
directly from his behavior;. Extending from their original
hypothesis (Cprrespondent Inference), Jones and Davis
analyzed seyeral factors which may influence the perceiver's
inference. They wanted to know what factors would facilitate
a perceiver's attribution regarding Professor Kenny's

intent. More spepifically, was the Professor's sarcastic
remark hostile pr was no ill will actually intended? A
partial explanation provided by Jones and Davis is that the
socio^cultural desirabilitv of the viewed behavior is an

important determinant of the perceiver's attributions of
intent and disposition.

According tP this view, behavior
10

that is unexpected, or low in desirability, will be more
informative to the perceiver and more conducive to a

dispositional inference, than behavior that is expected or

high in desirability. For example, most societies have
underlying social norms, and negative behavior (i.e.,
behavior contrary to the societal norm) is more informative
about the individual than is behavior which is positive or
conforms to the norm.

Another determinant of a correspondent inference is
non-common effects. According to Jones and Davis (1965),
information about the consequences of alternative actions is
used to infer the intention behind a particular act. The

principle behind non-common effects is that the intention
underlying a voluntary act is more clearly evident when it
has a small number of effects that are unique to it (i.e.,
non-common). In other words, non-common effects represent
distinctive outcomes that follow from an act. In the

previous example, let's say a student named Fredrika is a

member of a serious group of students studying in the field
of archaeology. On several occasions this group has attended

many professional conventions and has participated in

several archaeological excavations. Thus, it could be
said that the group's activities are "common effects".

However, When the supervising Professor (Dr. Kenny) asked
his students (including Fredrika) to attend a very important
11

expedition in South America, everyone except Fredrika

accepts the invitation. Thus, Fredrika's decision not to go

is a non-common effect, relative to the group's decision,
since in the past all of Professor Kenny's students have
Participated in these types of activities. The observers of

Fredrika's behavior are more likely to make an dispositional

inference regarding her decision. They might infer that
Fredrika is not a dedicated student (dispositional
attribution), when in fact there may be situational factors
present (e. g., family matters). Jones and Davis argued that

non-common effects associated with an act, lead to a greater
likelihood of a dispositional attribution.
Kellev "Covariation Principle". Unlike Jones and

Davis, Kelley's (1967,1972,1973) research investigated how
people make attributions to others and the self. Kelley
argued that his theory applies egually well to

iself-perception as it does to person perception. Extending
Heider's original thesis that casual judgements can be

examined via the experimental method, Kelley theorized that

people make causal attributions as if they were analyzing
data patterns by means of an analysis of variance (ANOVA).
Thus, Kelley followed Heider (1944) in the use of a version

of J. S. Mill's "method of difference": i.e., an effect is
attributed to a condition that is present when the effect is

present, and absent when the effect is absent.
12

This, Kelley

argued, was the underlying logic of his covariation
principle which fundaiftentally operates in his attributional
ANOVA model (HewstoneV 1983).

Recall earlier that Hume's

third rule on constant union states that causes and effects

must occur together.

It is interesting to note the

similarity between Hume's rule and Kelley's covariation
principle that "an effect is attributed to the one of its

possible causes with which, over time, it covaries"
(Kelley, 1973, p.109).

Kelley's initial interest in attribution was to address

the question of what information is used in arriving at
casual attributions. Kelley outlined two different
attributional situations depending on the amount of
information given to the perceiver. He called these two
cases covariation and configuration.

Under covariation, the

perceiver has information frOm multiple sources and can
perceive the covariation of an observed effect and its

possible cause. The classes of possible causes are persons,
entities (environmental stimuli) and times (occasions or
situations). According to Kelley, attributors use three

types of information to verify cause and effect relation
ships. The three types of information: distinctiveness.
consistency and consensus.

Utilizing the previous example, lets' say Professor
Kenny laughs at a former colleague. Observers, according to
13

KelleyVs Anova model, would make an attribution based upon
the information with which it covaries. Presumably, this
outcome could be caused by something about the person

(Professor Kenny), the stimulus (former colleague), the
circumstance (the occasion on which the outcome occurred),
or a combination of these factors.

that

Kelley's model suggested

observers use three possible ways to examine

variations in effects:

1) over people - do other Professors

as a group laugh at this colleague? (consensus information);
2) over stimuli - does Professor Kenny laugh at other
colleagues? (distinctiveness information); 3) over time 

has Professor Kenny laughed at the same colleague in the
past? (consistency information). The covariation principle
would suggest that: if only Professor Kenny laughs at the
colleague (low consensus), if he also laughs at other
colleagues (low distihctiveness), and if he has laughed at
this colleague in the past (high consistency), the effect

will be attributed to something about the person (Professor
Kenny).

Configuration, on the other hand, pertains to the idea
that a perceiver must take into account the "configuration"

of factors leading to an observed effect. In other words, if
the perceiver lacks critical information when multiple
causes are present, the perceiver will make attributions
based on "causal schemata." Kelley argued that these
14'.-
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schemata were built up from experience about how certain

types of Causes interact to produce specific types of
effects.

Kelley outlined two types of causal schemata from
which other schemas could

be generated.

These include

multiple sufficient cause (MSG) schema and multiple
necessary cause (MNC) schema. Kelley's MSG schema assumes
that different causes (e.g., adverse home background, poor
school environment and lack of individual effort) produce

the same effect (e. g., exam

failure). The operation of

this schema has been observed in studies demonstrating the
"discounting principle"; given that different causes produce

the same effect, the role of a given cause (e.g., lack of

effort) in producing the effect (failure) is attenuated if
other plausible causes are present (e.g., problems at home)
(Kelley, 1972).

Kelley argued that causes can be inhibitory or
facilitative to an effect. For example, to succeed in

an exam, problems at home would be seen as an inhibiting
cause. In this case the "augmenting principle" might be

applied. According to the augmenting principle, the role of

certain causes (e.g., individual effort) is augmented when
the presence of another cause (e.g., hoitie problems) would be
seen to inhibit the effect. Thus, an individual who has home

problems and succeeds on an exam may have success attributed
. ■ 15

more to internal factors (such as effort) than would a
student who does not have home problems. Kelley has not

explained the details of how and when schemata are used.
However, the most common assumption is that lay people make
attributions as if they were using schemata to meet the need

for a fast, economical analysis (Hewstone, 1983).

The present study will investigate causal judgements
using contemporary learning theory as a guide. Since

behavior patterns are presumably governed by less
complicated mechanisms, the knowledge gained from the
investigation of elementary processes (e.g. classical
conditioning) can be used to guide the study of more complex
behavior systems. Therefore, a brief examination of relevant
learning theory and its application towards social causal

judgements follows.
LEARNING THEORY

Like attribution researchers early traditional learning
theorists were greatly influenced by the ideas and

philosophies of the British Associationists (e.g., Hume,
Locke, Bacon). For example, the mechanisms by which

associations develop in Pavlovian conditioning were thought
to occur by the simple pairing or contiguity of antecedent
and consequent stimuli (Rescorla, 1988).

This historical

idea in classical conditioning is reminiscent of Hume's

16

third rule on causality and is conceptually similar to

Kelley's covariation principle. It is in this ideological
framework that attributional judgements may be related to or
follow from associations.

Pavlov's "Overshadowing".

Pavlov's work in classical

conditioning demonstrated that organisms could learn to make

new responses to stimuli and learn about the relations
between stimuli. More specifically, the essential features
of classical conditioning is a paradigm where an

unconditioned stimulus (US) which reliably produces a
measurable unconditioned response (UR) is paired with a
neutral or conditioned stimulus (GS). As a function of

repeated pairings the OS eventually elicits

a response in

the absence of the US. This response is called a conditioned

response (OR). Pavlov described and explained several

conditioning phenomena like acquisition and extinction
(Schwartz, 1989). However, of particular importance in the
development of contemporary thinking in Pavlovian
conditioning, was a learning phenomena discovered by

Pavlov

called overshadowing and inhibition (Mackintosh, 1974;
Rescorla, 1971; Schwartz, 1989).

Pavlov's overshadowing phenomena demonstrated that the
strength of conditioning to one stimulus depended upon
whether it was presented alone or in a stimulus compound.
When a compound CS consisting of thermal and tactile stimuli
17

was paired with a US and subjects were tested using each
component in isolation, only the more intense CS would
elicit the stronger CR's.

Hence, Pavloy concluded that the

stronger of the two component stimuli would "overshadow" the

weaker to a greater or lesser extent dependent on the
relative intensities of the two stimuli (Macintosh, 1974).

The implications of overshadowing suggested that the
principles of simple contiguity failed to explain this
conditioning. If simple contiguity was necessary and
sufficient for conditioning to occur, than each CS (the more

and less intense) in the compound would have conditioned
equally.

Although this phenomena was not thoroughly

investigated until much later (Kamin, 1968; Wagner, Logan,
Haberlandt, & Price, 1968), it began a new era in learning

theory by initiating inquiry into the nature of selective
association.

Kamin's "Blocking". Support for the general
overshadowing effect based on prior experience (blocking)
comes from a series of studies by Kamin (1968). Kamin's

blocking experiment showed that conditioning of CS (A) with
a particular US to asymptote attenuates or blocks the

ability of the US to produce conditioning to a new CS (X)
when it is introduced to the conditioning situation. In
demonstrating the "blocking effect". Kamin (1968, 1969)
developed a three phase experimental sequence using a
18

conditioned suppression procedure in rats. During phase ohe,

stimulus (A) is paired with the US in the experimental group
while a control group receives no single stimulus

conditioning. During phase two the experimental and control

group receive conditioning trials in which stimulus (A) is

presented in a compound with (X) and paired

with the US

(AX+). A subsequent test of response strength to stimulus
(X) alone indicates that less conditioning occurs to
stimulus (X) in the experimehtal group than in the control

group. Arguably/ conditioning to (X) was blocked in the
experimental group because prior conditioning to (A) reached
asymptote thus allowihg the US to become ineffective and
therefore no new coriditioning to (X) could occur.

Overshadowing and blocking effects suggest that a
simple CS-US contiguity mechanism fails to capture

adequately the relation required to produce an association.
Consider for example a real life event. A man goes to a

restaurant eats a meal and gets sick. Ih this situation
there are numerous cues most of which fall within the

boundaries of temporal contiguity with the effect and could
serve as the CS for the man's illness. The plate on which

the food was served, the waitress, the background music,

could all serve as potential CSs since these stimuli are
within the temporal limits necessary for successful

Pavlovian conditioning. The question is how, or by what
19

criteria the organism selects one of the stimuli as the CS

over other potential cues?

This question falls

within a

general class of problems termed stimulus selection. Rudy
and Wagner (1975) describe the stimulus selection problem as

"one of specifying the rules whereby a relationship will or
will not appear to be learned about depending upon the
context of environmental events in which it is embedded (p.
270)
Rescorla-Waqner's "Stimulus selection Problem". In an

attempt to address the stimulus selection problem, Rescorla

and Wagner (1972) proposed that organisms behave as if they
estimate the information embedded in the different stimuli

with respect to the probabilities of the US appearance.

Theoretically, organisms form selective associations between
the US and the stimulus which contains the maximum

information

about possible occurrence of the US. More

specifically, stimuli that covary reliably in the past with
the US become better predictors of the US and would
therefore be selected: as the CS. Based on their predictions,

Rescorla and Wagner developed a mathematical model

(neo—Hullian) which assumes that the gain in learning on
each trial is dependent both on what has been conditioned

prior to that trial and the theoretical asymptote of
learning a US can support. Rescorla and Wagner's model Was
able to explain and predict Kamin's blocking effect by
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arguing that the associative strengths of component stimuli
(A and X) change due to the net combination of the
components, not each component separately. In other words,

the more

significant an effect (US) is on changing the

associative strength of a stimulus depends on the existing
strength of that stimulus and on other stimuli present. The
Rescorla-Wagner model will be presented again in more
detail.

SOCIAL LEARNING THEORY

The parallels between simple learning situations
previously mentioned and situations within the framework of
attribution theory should be apparent. Substitution of the

CS (or antecedent stimulus) and the US (or consequent

stimulus) by terms like persons and behaviors would produce
a typical attribution problem. Recall earlier that Kelley's
theoretical analysis of cause-effect judgements were based
on contiguity. However, when multiple causes are present
(multiple CSs) attribution theory offers explanations like

discounting and augmenting, but does not explain the
mechanisms governing which cause-effect judgements are made
given contextual variation. Initially, learning theory also
fell prey to the idea that cause-effect associations were a

product of contiguity. However, when compound CSs (or
multiple causes) were introduced in conditioning, learning
■

■
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theory advanced by proposing new models and theories to
explain and predict contextual variation in
stimulus-stimulus associations (e.g., Rescorla-Wagner

Model). Thus, it can be argued that the advances made in
contemporary learning theory can be applied to guide the

present research and to better understand attribution
processes.

Allov and Tabachnik. One of the many ideas from

Miller's (1959) approach that the proposed study adopts is
the view that basic learning processes found in the

laboratory can be applied to explain more complex social
phenomena. Consistent with this approach. Alloy and
Tabachnik (1984) proposed a theoretical framework for

understanding and integrating animal learning phenomena and
human covariation judgements.

More specifically, they

postulated that animals as well as humans perceive event
contingencies and that judgements based on covariation are
an interactive process between prior expectations about
event relationships and current available situational
information. According to Alloy and Tabachnik, how an

organism makes judgements and/or modifies its behavior
depends upon relevant expectations and objective situational
information as well as on the degree to which these two

sources of information converge (see also Rescorla, 1988).
Shanks and Dickinson. SimilarIv. Shanks and Dickinson
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,

(1987) have suggested that empirical and theoretical
analyses of the impact of event contingencies developed
within animal conditioning may illuminate the processes
underlying human judgments of causality. They argued that
empirical similarities like acquisition functions,

contextual blocking and signaling effects found in animal

conditioning can be applied to the understanding of human
causality judgements. In particular, they suggest that an

associative view be applied to human causality judgements.

In demonstrating parallels between animal conditioning
and human causal judgements. Shanks and Dickinson (1987)
showed that when human subjects are given a task to judge

the relationship between an action and an outcome, their
judgements are sensitive to contingencies between the
probability of the outcome given the action P(0/A) and the

probability of the outcome given no action P(0/-A). For
example, previous research showed that acquisition and
blocking effects occur in human learning (Chapman, 1991;
Chapman & Robbins, 1990; Cramer, Weiss, Steigleder, &
Balling, 1985; Dickinson, Shanks, & Evenden, 1984; Shanks,

1985). Dickensonet al. (1984) asked subjects to judge the
extent to which pressing a key caused an effect to occur on
a computer screen.

In the first stage of the study,

subjects Withessedttials oh which an alternative cue (A)
reliably predicted the effect. In the second stage, subjects
'23
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performed the action (A) at the same time as cue (B)
occurred, and this combination of potential causes was

followed by the effect. Finally, subjects made judgements
about the causal relationship between the action and the
effect. Dickinson et al, found that the subject's judgements

were significantly reduced in the blocking condition
compared to the control condition in which cue (B) had
not been paired with the effect in the first stage.
Wasserman. In a more recent study, Wasserman (1990)

evaluated the parallels between animal associative learning
and human causal judgements by exploring the empirical
convergence of experimental manipulations in both domains.

Wasserman (1974) showed that in his autoshaping procedure

with pigeons and in his study with human causal judgements
(1990) the functional learning curves of human causal

ratings and pigeon keypecks over differeritial correlations
of AX-BX compounds demonstrated a similar pattern. In
Wasserman•s 1990 study, college students were asked to

judge the efficacy of three foods (peanuts, Shi'imP/ and
strawberries) in causing a patients's allergic reaction.

Food combinations Were varied along with the presence or
absence of an allergic reaction,

Wasserman found that if a

subject can predict that shrimp/ for example, causes the

allergic reaction and peanuts do riot, then shrimp is given

causal priority. More specifically, shrimp and peanuts have
/■ ■ ■ ;2:4- '

different associative strengths depending upon the
differential correlation wiph the occurrence or
non-occurrence of illness. However, if a subject cannot
discriminate whether or not it is the shrimp or the peanuts

causing the allergic reaction, then both foods Ore given

causal priority. In essence, both foOds have^^^^^^^^t^^^

Same

associative strength. Gonsistent with contemporary learning
theory, Wasserman has demonstrated that subjects trying to
judge an effect from multiple causes use information about
the differential predictiveness of each of the stimuli.

The developments in the research mentioned above

indicates the possibility that models of elementary
associative learning may have explanatory value in human
causal judgements. Shanks (1987) and Wasserman (1990) have
suggested that historical observations or insights from some

of the earliest thinkers in behavior, more specifically,

David Hume can inform and inspire research and theory in
learning and causal judgments. In fact, according to Hume,
"a causal judgment is seen as reflecting no more than the
strength of the relevant association between the mental

representations of the cause and effect, with the principles
governing the attributions being those of associative

learning " (Shanks & Dickenson, 1987, p. 230).
In addition, what seems to be common among all the

studies previously mentioned is how the perceiver makes
25

causal judgements given information about the differential
associative strength or probabilities of potential causes
and effects in the causal judgement task. Might not these
researchers be addressing the stimulus selection problem?

I

am arguing that it is possible to address social causal
judgements in terms of the stimulus selection problem. That
is, given a particular social situation or context, what
rule or rules do observers use when attributing a cause to

an event?

Stating the problem another way, what rules do

people use to attribute a particular cause to a particular
effect based upon the social context (e.g., the presence of

other people) in which these two stimuli are embedded?
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STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

The present study is part of a program of research
designed to test several attribution hypotheses using
conditioning variables and analogous variables in social
psychology.

Technique of Theory Construction. Through the use of
analogy, a relatively well understood conditioning model is
used to guide the investigation of a less well understood
research area. In particular, analogies will be drawn
between classical conditioning independent and dependent

variables and variables assumed to be important in the
development of social causal judgements. Theoretically,

the empirical relationships holding among the variables
in the conditioning model should also hold among the
corresponding attribution variables (Oppenheimer, 1956;
Nagel, 1961).

Rules of Correspondence. Analogies drawn between

classical conditioning variables and variables assumed to be

important in attribution are as follows:

Corresponding to a

conditioned stimulus (OS) is a discriminable Social

stimulus, such as a worker (A) or two workers (AX) or three
workers (ABX)

/Rule 1). Corresponding to an unconditioned

stimulus (US) is a social stimulus, such as a company's
production level which elicits "striving for" responses

21

(Staats, 1975) or our term for cause attribution,

invariance-seeking action, (Rule 2) with response so

elicited being analogous to an unconditioned response (UR)
(Rule 3).

The conditioned form of the UR analog (speed, or

probability of invariance seeking action) corresponds to a
conditioned response (CR) (Rule 41. The number of CS-US

pairings (reinforced trials) corresponds to the number of CS
analog - US analog pairings an constitute attribution

acquisition trials (Rule_5).

A trial on which the worker(s)

is not followed by the company's production level

constitutes an extinction trial (Rule 6). Corresponding to
an inhibition procedure is presenting two social CS
analogues (one previously paired with the effect of interest

(A) and one a novel stimulus (X) not followed by the effect

of interest; theoretically stimulus X becomes a conditioned

inhibitor of causal attribution

(Rule 7).

Corresponding to

a reinforced compound CS trial is an attribution trial where

two or more social stimuli, such as worker (A) and worker
(X) are paired with the company's production level (Rule 81.

Corresponding to the CS saliency is the saliency or

vividness of the CS

analog (Rule 9^. The power of a social

stimulus, such as a company's production level in eliciting
invariance seeking action corresponds to the intensity
of the US (Rule lOV.

Although the rules developed here are illustrative
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rather than exhaustive, they are sufficiently detailed to
permit further theoretical develppment. The derivation of
acquisition and blocking effects follows from the

specification of a detailed mechanism for using the Rules of
Correspondence.

Rescorla-'Waqner Theorv. Arguably, the Rescorla-Wagner
model can address the stimulus selection problem in causal

attribution. More specifically, the Rescorla-Wagner model
assumes that the effectiveness of a US in increasing the

associative strength of a OS (VA) attenuates as the
signal yalue of the cue increases.

Changes in associative

value of the CS (A VA) are determined by the difference
between the cue's current associative strength (VA) and the

theoretical asymptote of conditioning supportable by the US

(X.).

As the difference between the associative strength of

a CS and theoretical asymptote of conditioning (X - VA)
decreases across conditioning trails, increases in the

associative strength of the CS will progressively diminish
resulting in a negatively accelerated learning curve

(acquisition). Stated another way, Rescorla and Wagner
(1972) suggest that changes in the associative strength

of a CS are not determined by the current strength of
that component stimulus alone but the total associative

strength of all cues present in the conditioning
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situation, including cpntext cues.

Thus, the theory

predicts that conditioning of a neutral CS will be

affected by the comjibsite associative strengfth of all
background stimuli contiguous with the US, If the total

associative strength of all stimhli is at or near asymptote^

the US

will be ineffective in conditioning any new cue

(blocking).

The Rescorla-Wagner Model (1973) assumes that the

associative strength of a compound (V AX) is a function
of the strengths of the component cues

A and

X. Rescorla

and Wagner also assumed that the associative strengths

combined additively: V AX =

V A +

V X,

where the value of

the theoretical limit on conditioning sets limits on the
total strength of the compound. Prior Gohditioning to

stimulus A would be expected to block conditioning to
stimulus X if AX were reinforced together.

Following the

logic presented above, if the asymptote of conditioning is
reached by reinforcing A then the difference between the

asymptote (X)

and the associative strength of all stimuli

(VAX) present during conditioning will be zero (A. ^ VAX =
0). Hence, conditioning to X will be attenuated or blocked.

From an attribution perspective, prior association of an
event to a possible cause (A) reduces the degree to which
another plausible cause (X) could be advanced later even
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though both "causes" appear with the

event.

This situation

mirrors Kamin's "blocking effect".
Hypothesis #1 - Acquisition Effects. Classical

conditioning in general, and Rescorla-Wagner theory in
particular, suggest that repeatedly pairing a neutral cue
(CS) with reinforcement (US) will contribute to the cue's
acquisition of associative strength. A negatively
accelerated increasing learning curve for the conditioned
response (CR) will result. Developing and manipulating
analogous attribution independent and dependent variables
should produce empirical relationships which are similar to

the conditioning relationships. Hence, we predict that
repeatedly pairing a single worker (A) with the company
meeting its productivity goal will result in the development
of stronger casual attributions to the worker.

The

subject's causal attributions to the worker (invariance

seeking actions (ISA) = CR analog) should be evidenced by
mapping negatively accelerated ISA responses across

evaluation trials, (Rules of Correspondence 1 - 5).
Hypothesis #2 - Blocking Effects. The blocking effect

hypothesis is derived from the Cxpecta'feioh that GOnditioning
to a single antecedent stimulus takes place in a context
containing any number of other stimuli. Rescorla and Wagner

I demonstrated a stimulus present during conditioning which
I already reliably signals the unconditioned stimulus, will
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block or retard conditioning to a new stimulus.

Hence, we

predict causal attributions to a target stimulus worker X

will be blocked if he is paired with the company meeting its
productivity goal in the presence of another worker A who

reliably predicts production goal attainment. In other
words, blocking should be evidenced by weaker casual
attributions to the worker X because another worker has a

history of being associated with the company meeting its
goal. (Rules of Correspondence 1-5 and 8).
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GENERAL METHOD

Subjects. Sixty female and male subjects were randomly
assigned to a blocking group (Group 1) or one of two control
groups (Groups 2 and 3).

within each group.

Subjects' gender was balanced

Subjects were recruited from

undergraduate psychology courses at California State

University, San Bernardino. All subjects were treated in
accordance with the Ethical Principles of the American
Psychological Association, one male and five female members

of the Social Learning Research Group served as
experimenters.

Masking Task. It has been argued that the subject's

awareness that their behavior is being recorded may distort
the

validity of the research.

Thus, in order to alleviate

reactivity biases, a slight deception regarding the true
nature of the experiment was necessary.

The Conditioning

experiment was masked by describing it as a study

investigating a computerized employee evaluation

system. We instructed tlje subjodfe^^a^^

"In this

study we are interested in i^estihg the efficiency of a
computerized employee evaluation system. Your cooperation is
appreciated and necessary for examining the usefulness of
the automated program.

In brder to test carefully the

effectiveness of the system, it will be necessary for you to
33 ■

assume the role of a production supervisor in a large
company."

Additional instructions indicated that,

"You

will be given information about three part-time employees,
Sam, Joe, and Ted and tlieir company's level of productivity.

After reviewing a monthly productivity report it will be
your responsibility as Sam, Joe, an<i Ted's supervisor to

evaluate their performance and how effective they were in
causing tbe company•s leVisl of productivity. "Sam, Joe and

Ted are college students and are only available to work
part-time. However, it is important to evaluate Sam, Joe,

and Ted carefully each month because they may be considered
for full time employment upon graduation."
In conditioning research the level of the US is

typically held constant except where magnitude of the US

effects are specifically tested.

However, in social

learning research holding the level of productivity (US
analog) constant is vinrealistic.

To maintain mundane

realism, slight variations in leVel of productivity were
used.

Mora specifically,

prbduction levels Gbmprised of

650, 700, and 750 Were indicated On a scale from 0 to 1000.

Expetimental Desiqri. In classical conditionirig a

discriminable antecedent stimulus is paired with a
discriminable conseguent stimulus. In the present study the
antecedent stimuli were fictional wbrker(s) named
Sam (blocking stimulus or A+), Joe (target stimulus or X+),

Ted (neutral stimulus or B-), and Sam and Joe presented

together (compound stimulus or AX+). The cpnsequent stimulus
was a fictional company meeting its productivity goal.
(See Appendix A.) The experiment can be described as a

Groups X Trials repeated measures design.

The first

independent variable was the social context within which
the target worker, Joe (X), is paired with the cbmpany

meeting its productivity goal. Invariance seeking
action acquisition trials constituted the second

independent variable.

The subject's strength of Causal

attributions to the target stimulus Joe (X+), (i.e.,
strength of invariance seeking action) constituted the

primary dependent variable.

Other secondary dependent

variables included subject ratings on the following: 1) the
extent to which worker X was effective in causing the
company to meet its goal; 2) subject's confidence in his/her
rating of worker X's effectiveness is causing the company's
goal; 3) the effectiveness of worker X's fellow employees

causing the company goal to be met.
Apparatus and Materials.

Previous research has

demonstrated the utility of using a computer to administer

the stimulus material when examining causal relationships
(See Dickinson, Shanks, & Evenden 1984; Shanks & Dickinson,
1987; Shanks, 1987,1988). Thus, the subject module was

controlled using an IBM 386 PC and the software application
35

used was Micro experimental Language (MEL) version 120. This
application directed the presentation of the instructions,
the antecedent and consequent stimuli, manipulanda, and the
employee evaluation scale (EES).
On the computer Subject module a key pad numbered 0 to

100 allowed the subjects to rate the worker(s) using a 3

item employee evaluation scale (EES). The EES was designed
to measure worker effectiveness following the presentation

of the antecedent and consequent stimulus on each
conditioning trial.

For purposes of clarity, all EES

questions were anchored with a value of 0 indicating no
attribute to a value of 100 which equals the attribute. The
Ells contained three items which were as follows: 1) "Given
all the information you have received, on the scale below
indicate THE EXTENT TO WHICH SAM AND JOE WERE EFFECTIVE in

causing the company's level of PRODUCTIVITY." anchored with
the Phrases totallv ineffective and totallv effective; 2)
"HOW CONFIDENT ARE YOU ABOUT YOUR RATING OF SAM AND JOE as

being effective in

causing the company's level of

productivity." anchored with no confidence to complete
confidence; 3) "Given all of the information you have

received, indicate THE EXTENT TO WHICH SAM AND JOE'S FELLOW
WORKERS ARE EFFECTIVE in causing the company's level of
productivity." anchored with totallv ineffective to totally
effective.
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Note: the above items are examples of questions
that were presented when the antecedent stimulus is a

compound stimulus or presents two workers Sam and Joe (AX).
However, when the antecedent stimulus presents one worker,

Sam (A+), Joe (X+), or Ted (B-) the EES will ask questions

pertaining to the worker that is viewed on that particular
trial. The six test trials evaluating the target worker Joe
(X+) are of particular importance for testing the
hypothesis.

Procedure. Upon entering the laboratory, subjects were
asked to read and sign a consent form (see Appendix B).
The experimenter then asked the subjects to sit in front

of the subject module while s/he activates the MEL program.
At the beginning of the program subjects received
instructions pertaining to one of the three treatment

conditions (see Appendix C). Following the instructions the

antecedent stimulus (the workers) appeared for 5 seconds
on the left side of the computer monitor.

After the

antecedent stimulus had been illuminated for 5 seconds, the
consequent stimulus was presented and illuminated for 10

seconds on the right side of the computer monitor, with both

the antecedent and consequent stimulus extinguishing
together after 10 seconds. The entire computer monitor then

went blank, and item one from the EES appeared for 15

seconds. Subjects were asked to respond to the item
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using a computer keypad.

After the subject responded

evaluation item one went off and item two then appeared on

for 15 seconds. This sequence was repeated, in turn,
for the remaining third item. After the subjects

responded to item three the program recycled to the
antecedent stimulus. The cycle was repeated 18 times in

Group 1, 12 times in Group 2, and 18 times in Group 3. After
the subjects completed the sequence of cycles they were

thoroughly debriefed and given the opportunity to have all
of their questions answered (see Appendix D).
Group 1 - Blocking (A+/AX+). Subjects were exposed
to the antecedent and consequent stimuli a total of 18

times. All 18 trials presented to the subjects were randomly

interspersed and consisted of six blocking stimuli (A+) or
(worker Sam trials), and six compound stimuli (AX+) or

(workers Sam and Joe trials), followed by six target stimuli
(X+) or (worker Joe alone trials).

Each antecedent stimulus

was followed by the consequent stimulus or company goal
production level. After each antecedent and consequent

stimulus presentation, the subjects responded to the EES.
Group 2 - Control fAX+V. Subjects in Group 2 were
treated similarly to subjects in Group 1 except the
antecedent and consequent stimuli Were presented a total

of 12 times. Six of the trials presented were compound
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stimuli, or Sam and Joe paired with the company meeting
the production goal (AX+). Following thereafter were six
target stimuli or test trials with the worker Jpe paired
with company meeting the production goal (X+). Because
blocking is a between groups phenomenon, groups 2 and 3
differs from group 1, such that, there was no exposure to

the blocking stimulus, or no (A+) trials were presented.
Group 3 - Control (B-/hX+ Control).

Group 3 served

as a control group for the amount of information provided
the subjects in Group 1. As in Group 1 the antecedent and

consequent stimulus were presented a total of 18 times.
However, six non reinforced or neutral trials presented the

worker Ted (B-) paired with no company production report.
Another six trials presented the compound stimuli or workers
Sam and Joe (AX+) paired with the, company meeting its
production goal. The remaining six trials were test trials,

and presented the target worker Joe (X+j paired with

the company meeting its production goal.. The twelve trials

including the neutral conditipning trials (B^) and the
compound conditioning trials (AX+) were randomly
interspersed, followed by six test trials, or six (X+)
trials. No blocking stimuli or (A+) trials were presented.

Note: For the blocking (A+)V compound (AX+), and target
stimuli (X+) conditions described for each group, the levels

of production (i.e. 650, 700, 750) were presented twice
3.9' , ■

in a randomized order.
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RESULTS

The analyses focused on the subjects* ratings of each
"employees" causal strength and the subjects* confidence in

their causal judgement.

Recall that both dependent

variables were measured on a 0 to 100 point scale across a
series of test trials. In order to examine the hypothesized

acquisition effects, a simple repeated measures was
performed on causal ratings provided by subjects in groups 1
and 3.

And, to examine blocking effects, subjects* causal

ratings of the target stimulus X (the worker named Joe),
were examined by performing a 3 groups by 6 trials repeated
measures ANOVA.

Causal Confidence Ratings. The validity of the primary
measure, subjects* ratings of Worker causal strength, is
enhanced if it can be demonstrated that the ratings are not

related to subjects* confidence in making the ratings.
Hence, the confidence variable was analyzed first in order

to eliminate possible confounds in subjects* causal
judgements. Prior causal attribution research (Shanks &
Dickinson, 1987) argued that the subjects* confidence in

their judgement must be consistent regardless of
experimental group assignment. If this consistency is not
evident then their causal judgements may be an artifact of

the judgement task and not the conditioning procedures.
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Therefore subjects' are expected to be equally confident in
their estimates of either high or low worker causal
strength.

A 3 X 6 (Groups X Trials) repeated measures ANOVA
was performed on subjects' confidence ratings of their
estimates of the worker Joe's causal strength. Recall

that the subjects' ratings of the worker Joe's causal
strength is the primary variable for examining blocking
effects. The group, trials, and interaction effects,

were not statistically reliable. Groups, F (2,57) =

< 1, p > .05, Trials, F (5,285) = < 1, E > .05, C X T,
F (10,285) = 1.27, p > .05.

As expected these results

indicate that the subjects' confidence ratings were not
affected by the experimental manipulations. Hence, variation
in causal strength ratings were presumed to be due to the

conditioning phenomena.
Acauisition/US Intensitv. Usually, different groups in
a conditioning experiment begin at a similar low level of
performance, with differences in performance developing over
the course of trials. Therefore, as a general rule, tests
for rank order differences and differences in causal

judgement ratings of various experimental groups are made
late in learning over a block of the last few trials. In

testing acquisition a simple repeated measures analysis was
performed on the causal judgements for the blocking (A+) and
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neutral stimuli (B-), or for workers Sam and Ted, in Groups
1 and 3, respectively.

causal judgement to the blocking

stimulus (A+) were significantly different across the

trials, F (5,95) = 2.98, p < .02.

As expected, simple

repeated measures performed on the neutral stimulus (B-)
across the trials did not reveal a significant effect F
(5,95) = 1.93 E > .05.

An inspection of the blocking stimulus (A+) or worker
Sam's causal rating mean scores revealed that subjects' were
not responding as expected across the six repeated trials.

That is, no increasing function (i.e., learning curve) was
observed. At first glance, subjects appeared to be
responding in a haphazard fashion. However, upon closer

post hoc inspection the subjects were responding in a
predictable manner. Recall that as part of the masking
task, subjects rated the worker after being provided

information about his level of production. Variation in the
worker's level of monthly production was necessary in order

to maintain mundane realism of the supervisor-worker masking
task. When the means of the subjects' causal judgement
scores were averaged in blocks of 2 trials pertaining to

different levels of production (levels of US intensity) the
data showed a familiar learning effect. (See Figure 1).

As

the subjects were exposed to increasing levels of production

(US intensity) their averaged causal ratings increased
43.

Figure'.1
Mean causal •iudaement strength for the blocking stimulus,
worker Sam fA+>. and for the neutral stimulus. worker Ted
YB-^ . in blocks of two trials bv Groups 1 and 3♦
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correspondingly Pairwise comparisons, using a pooled error
term were performed on blocks of 2 levels of intensity for

subjects in Group 1.

No differences were observed between

blocks of 2 trials at intensity levels 650 and 700, (M =
69.80 vs M = 73.45), t(285) = 1.46, £ > .05; and between
levels 700 and 750, (M =73.45 vs M = 76.34), t(285) = 1.52,

P > .05.

However, a significant range effect was observed

when the lowest intensity, 650, was compared to the highest

intensity, 750, (M = 69.80 vs 76.34), t(285) = 4.22, p <
.05.

As expected, in the no report condition (B-) mean

causal ratings were lower compared to the ratings for all
three levels of production paired with the single worker in

Group 1. No direct statistical comparisons were performed
because the A+ means are based on two trials of rating
information, whereas, the information for the B- trials
represent six test trials.

Blocking. Previous learning research has demonstrated
that Blocking is a between groups phenomenon.
order to examine Blocking effects

Thus, in

a 3 x 6 (Groups X

Trials) Manova was performed on subjects' causal ratings of
the target worker X.

reliable, condition

The groups were not statistically

F (2, 57) = < 1, p > .05, However, the

trials and C X T were significantly different. Trials, F (5,
285) = 7.17 p < .05; C XT, F (10, 285)
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= 6.46 p

< .05.

In examining worker (Joe) or target (X+) means by group

in blocks of two trails across production levels revealed a

systematic trend.

As the US or intensity level increased,

the subjects causal ratings increased correspondingly (See
Figure 2).

A pairwise comparison (one-tail) was performed on the

blocks of trials in Groups 1-3 over the three levels of
production.

No differences between the groups at each

intensity was observed, p > 05.
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Mean causal iuddement strength for the target stimulus.
worker Joe (X). fav Groups 1 td 3.
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DISCUSSION

Isolating critical variables in earlier attribution
research was essential in developing a foundation from
which further hypothesis were to iDe derived.

However, the

philosophy born from the British Associationist era was
the adopted underpinnings of earlier attribution research
and has been slow to change with more contemporary views of

associationism.

For example, earlier attribution principles

argued that an effect is attributed (causal judgement) to
one of its possible causes with which, over time, it
covaries.

The present research attempted to extend this

concept by examining how social causal judgements acquire
strength resulting from repeated presentations of events.

This research adopts a more current approach regarding the
mechanisms of associationism underlying social causal
judgements by employing contemporary learning theory and

paradigms.

In fact. Shanks and Dickenson (1987) argued

that the only area of psychdlogy that has offered an

associative account of a process sensitive to causality is
that of conditioning (p. 230).

Based upon contemporary

conditioning models, we generated hypotheses to
test acquisition and blocking effects in social causal
judgements and/or attributions.

The objective of the present research was to use a
■ '■ •48

contemporary learning model to experimentally test
hypotheses in attribution using conditioning variables and

analogous variables in social psychology.

As part of a

programmatic approach in examining human social causal

judgements, the present study extended current thinking on
complex attributional processes by taking into account the
role of situational variables or context within which human

causal judgements are made.

Historically, causal

attribution research has provided only limited explanations
for how the individual renders a causal judgement when
multiple causes are present.

In addition, previous

attribution research has utilized descriptive research

designs whereby subjects are processing causal judgements in
an all-or-none fashion.

The present study examined how

causal judgements regarding multiple plausible causes are
developed over time.

Causal Confidence Ratings.

Previous research (Shanks

and Dickenson, 1987) illuistrated the importance of

demonstrating that the results obtained in learning-analog
studies (acquisition) should not be an artifact of the

rating procedure.

They argued that the rating scale in

conditioning research may encourage subjects to confound

their assessment of causality with some other judgement
feature of the task when making the rating.

For example,

the subjects' confidence in making a particular rating may
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confound their judgments of causality.

In order to test for

this possible confound, the present research examined
confidence ratings on a 0 to 100 point scale with all

stimulus presentations.

Consistent with our prediction,

subjects' confidence ratings on the target stimulus (worker
Joe's) causal strength did not vary significantly as a

function of different group manipulations.

Thus, subjects

were capable of making orderly judgements of confidence

during the causal rating task.

Ruling out this potential

confound. Shanks and Dickenson argued, provides support for

an associative learning model of causal judgment strength.
Acquisition Effects.

When a subject is exposed to a

conditioning procedure, conditioned responses do not

typically start occurring at full strength, but, begin at a
lower level of strength and progressively increase in

strength until an asymptotic level is reached (acquisition).
The present study examined acquisition effects by pairing a

single worker with information regarding a company's level
of goal production over repeated trials.

Measuring the

strength of the conditioned response was assessed using the

subjects' causal strength ratings for workers Sam (A+ =
rewarded trials) and Ted (B- = non rewarded trials).
Although causal ratings for the worker (A+) were

significant across six trials in causal strength for Group
1, visual inspection of the causal strength means did not
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reveal the anticipated negatively accelerated acquisition

curve.

However, when the worker (A+) means were averaged in

blocks of two trials for each specific goal production level
predictable learning effects were evidenced.

As the level

of production increased from 650 to 750, subjects causal

judgement scores increased correspondingly and were higher
than causal judgements made to the worker (B-) paired with

no reinforcement (no information about the company's
production level). Such an effect would be expected based on
the assumption that changes in production levels were
analogous to changes in the intensity or magnitude of a

learning unconditioned stimulus (see Rule of Correspondence
#10).

The subjects were responding to the intensity of the

US or the company's level of production.

The more intense

the US (company goal), the higher the mean causal priority
was given to the worker (See Figure 1).
The present study provided subjects with different

information on production levels in order to establish

mundane realism.

Such a procedure would be unnecessary when

using non-human subjects in a classical conditioning

paradigmi

However, human subjects would become suspicious

if the company's production level remained constant across
the evaluation cycles.

We did not anticipate that the

subjects wouldl attend to only slight increments and
decrements in the (US) or company production level.
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In

retrospect, the subjects took very seriously the
instructional set and the masking task.

role as supervisors extremely well.

They played their

And, although the

acquisition data did not conform to expectations the results

are not without logic;
Intensity effects like those observed in Figure 1

indicate that a simple contiguity model for causal
attribution could not provide a complete explanation. If the

pairing of a worker (CS) and a company production level (US)
is all that is required for the development of causal
attribution strength then no production level intensity
effects would be expected.

Traditional social psychological

or "rule governed" explanations describing causal priorities
like Kellev's covariation principle, also do not easily
explain intensity effects.

Based upon the present results,

it appears that subjects are evaluating the informativeness
of stimuli and are making selective causal judgements based

upon that information.

The above discussion is admittedly

post hoc, but, Williams (1994) has demonstrated that varying
the contingency between CS and US, and thus challenging the

simple contiguity approach in the evaluation of human
causal judgements, produces systematic outcomes.
Blocking Effects.

In Group 1 subjects were expected to

give lower causal ratings to the target worker (Joe) because

of their prior experience with another worker (Sam) who was
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a reliable predictor of the company•s production level.

Learning psychologists argue that since antecedent stimulus
or a first worker already reliable predicts the outcome, the

target stimulus or in the present case a second worker will
become redundant (e.g. Wagner & Rescorla, 1972).

Therefore, the worker which initially was associated with

the outcome (e.g. company level of production) will be given
higher causal priority than a second worker although paired
with the same outcome (e.g. level of production) because
this information is redundant. Hence, causal attributions to
the second worker are expected to be blocked.

In the

present research blocking effects were not observed.
However, in the present research the target worker was not

redundant. Because of the

necessary changes in the

company's level of production the second worker actually

predicted different outcomes.

Arguably, such a procedure is

not appropriate for studying blocking.

In fact, when a

target stimulus is paired with an increase in the US
strength (higher company production level) a phenomenon know
as unblocking can be expected.

Unblocking would be expected

to result in stronger, not weaker, causal attribution to the

target worker.

Therefore, the procedure designed to produce

mundane realism may have produced the unexpected outcomes.
Boundary Conditions.

In general, the results from

theory-generated research, and in particular, the results
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from the present study, should be interpreted within a
narrow range of conditions (Logan, 1959).

The general

method from the present study serves as an explicit
Statement for some of the boundary conditions, particularly
in regard to the discrete-trials procedure, the conditioning
of a single response, the control of competing responses,

and the choice of dependent variable.

Typically, social

psychological attribution research regarding the strength of

human causal judgments utilize descriptive events of social
action rather than presenting information about social
behavior over time. For example, subjects are given a

descriptive account of some social action (like a vignette)
and then asked to make an attribution "all-or-none" based

upon the information from this single observation. However,
the present study, which was concerned with conditioning and
contextual variables in social causal attributions, examined

how multiple presentations of antecedent and consequent

stimuli effect social causal judgements over time. The
potential context effects suggested here may generalize only
to situations where information is presented repeatedly
rather than to descriptive accounts of social action.

However, the conditioning strategy tested and reported on
here have a broader application than the unusual

experimental procedure seems to imply. For example,
conditioning analogies from both instrumental and Pavlovian
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learning models have successfully been used to study a

variety of social phenomena: altruism (Weiss, Buchanan,
Alstatt, & Lombardo 1971); attitudes (Weiss, 1962);

attraction (Cramer, Weiss, Steigleder, & Balling, 1985);
competition (Steigleder, Weiss, Cramer, & Feinberg, 1978);
and male sex role action (Cramer, Lutz, Bartell, Dragna, &

Helzer, 1989). Rather than appealing to only a narrow range
of learning phenomena, the research strategy described here
may serve to strengthen and extend previous findings
regarding human causal judgements.

Research boundary conditions can also be established by

recognizing disanalogies between important learning
variables and theoretical analogous social variables.

For

example, in learning psychology conditioning is presumed to
follow from the use of neutral discriminable antecedent

stimuli.

We know that conditioning is retarded when

putative conditioned stimuli are familiar to the subject by
preexposure or by a preexisting conditioning history.

The

present study assumed that the human employees about which
the subject had only scant knowledge were analogous to
disCriminable neutral antecedent stimuli in conditioning

research.

However, the present results argue that such an

assumption may not be valid.

The argument is based upon

data provided by subjects in Group 3 (i.e. subjects
receiving non reinforced or B- trials).
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Theoretically, the

strength of causal attributions to a worker not paired with

company production irtformation should not appreciably
increase. In other words, presenting an antecedent stimulus
without presenting an effect should not result in causal

attributions to the antecedent stimulus.

In Group 3,

however, causal judgement strength averaged a mean score of

52.60 on a 100 point scale.

Arguably, human or human

representations (employees) do not serve as neutral
antecedent stimuli. That is, humans are "at cause" by being
"at cause", and estimates of their contribution to an effect

can vary, but, will not be negligible.
Another implication of the humans are "at cause"

phenomenon is that conditioning of causal attributions may
not begin at or near zero in strength.

Recall that in

Group 1 and 2, subjects received a series of worker
productivity pairings and were measured for their estimates
Of causal strength following each pairing.

The average

causal judgements in Group 1, for example, ranged between
60.80 to 76.34 for blocks of two trials.

In no instance did

the subjects give causal judgement ratings averaging at or
near zero.

In fact, the causal strength rating presented in

Figure 1 may represent only increases from an unanticipated

baseline of approximately 50. The baseline of 50 is derived
from information provided by subjects in Group 3 (B-).

The

present study's acquisition and blocking effects may have
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been negatively effected by such a restricted range in

conditionable causal judgeinent strength.

Implications For Future Research. Mapping learning
research variables to social analogues in human causal

judgements have yielded predictable outcomes (See William,
1994; Kuhn, 1993).

However, in the present study the

predicted learning phenomenon, acquisition and blocking,
were not achieved, not because the variables were

not tightly drawn (see Rules of Correspondence), but,
because unanticipated effects may have developed as a

function of the change in "saliency" of the US, and/or the
company production goal always being met. Recall that in

the present study subjects received information indicating
that the company's production goal was always exceeded.
They also received information indicating that the
particular level of production varied across evaluation
periods. The rationale for the latter information

was to maintain mundane realism of the worker-supervisor

masking task.

In retrospect, variation in the production

level information may have been important for making causal

judgements because the company's production goal was always
exceeded.

Goal information, because it was not held

constant, could not be used by the subjects for evaluation

of the target worker, rather, the subjects were thoughtfully
interpreting the production variations as a basis for causal
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judgement. This behavior on the part of the subjects would
undermine the theoretical necessity of holding the US

constant and observing the blocking effect.

Further

research must resolve the issues surrounding variation in
the production effects or other US analogs.
Because humans may be "at cause" or are adept at

discriminating between slight variations of stimuli
in their environment, the interspersed trials procedure
that the present research utilized may not have been the
most appropriate protocol.

Recall that earlier in the

blocking procedure, subjects were presented with six trials

of a single CS interspersed with 6 trials with a compound
CS, followed by six trials of a single worker CS which
served as a test for measuring causal judgement strength. As

the results indicated, subjects who where exposed to the
blocking group did not "block" or attenuate their causal
judgement scores to the (novel) single worker in the
compound. In essence, the (novel) single worker did not
prove to be "redundant", but, on the different trials

predicted a new outcome. Further research may consider using

a phase conditioning procedure (Rescorla & Wagner, 1972)
where each type of single stimulus and compound stimulus are

grouped and presented in distinct phases. Utilizing this
procedure coupled with eliminating the arbitrary goal may in
fact be one solution for observing predictable effects in
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acquisition and blocking of social causal judgement.

Clinical Applications.

The influence of how multiple

causes affect causal judgements over time may be applied to

several social situations wheire human social exchange is
implied in the rendering of some causaT attributions. More
specifically, any therapeutic approach and/or client-

therapist relationship may be affected by how contextual
variables are conditioned over time. For example, William
(1994) demonstrated that multiple causes influencing causal

judgements may follow from contemporary learning principles
like acquisition and contingency (base-rate) effects.
William suggested that "contingency effects" may
parallel the client therapeutic relationship, such that

the clinician's assessment (cause judgement) for a

particular client may be biased when the client is present
in an individual therapy session vs when the client is in a
group therapeutic situation.

Supporting Williams'

point of view, Cline (1985) has argued that there is no
general review of the impact of the clinical situation on
clinical judgement, and has suggested that whether a client

is interviewed alone or in his/her family group will
significantly influence the interviewer's evaluation of
his/her client.

Blocking of social causal judgements may be evidenced
in any therapeutic setting as well.
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Psychiatric patients

are at risk for suicide 3 to 12 times greater than that of

non-patients.

It has been reported that the degree of risk

varies according to age, sex, diagnosis, and inpatient or

outpatient status. More specifically, in a closed
psychiatric facility, where patients are monitored

routinely, suicides are reported more often among patients
diagnosed with depression than individuals diagnosed with
psychosis (Kaplan & Sadock/ 1991). If there is no
difference in documented patient observation records on the

unit, then, why should such differential suicide rates be

evidenced? It may be possible that "blocking" of patient
observations is occurring. In other words, the inpatient
staff who monitors the activities of psychiatric patients

may be making differential observation rounds (or
attributions) because of the saliency of the diagnosis.
For example, let's say a psychotic suicidal individual (A+)

is brought to a psychiatric hospital and is placed on
routine observation rounds every fifteen minutes.

Then,

later in time, a depressed individual (X+) is also admitted
to the hospital and placed on routine observations (AX+).

Previous expetrience and threat to injury with the psychotic

individual will alert health care professionals to observe
the patient more closely than the depressed individual
because the psychotic individual is the most salient

stimulus. Attributions of suicidality to the depressed
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person is "bloclced" because the depressed persons does not
predict any threat (US).

Hence, causal judgements

(perceived threat) to the depressed individual is "blocked",
therefore, the depressed person may go unnoticed and hence
is more likely to successfully attempt suicide in a

psychiatric facility.
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APPENDIX A

Antecedent and Consequent Stimuli

Compound stimulus Sam and Joe (AX+) and company production
report.
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Appendix A (cont'd)
Antecedent and Gonseauent Stimuli

Blocking Stimulus Sam (A+) alone and company production
report.
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Appendix A (cont'd)
Antecedent and Consequent Stimuli

Target stimulus Joe (X+) alone and company productidn
report.;V

QOAL
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Appendix A (cont'd)
Antecedent and Consequent Stimuli

Neutral stimulus Ted (B-) and no company production report.
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APPENDIX B

Consent Form
EMPLOYEE EVALUATION SYSTEM

I am volunteering to participate as a subject in this study.
I understand that the purpose of this study is to test the

efficiency of a computerized employee evaluation system.

I

understand that the information will be presented to me via
a computer monitor and that I will be asked to assume the
role of a production supervisor in a large company.

I understand that my name will NOT be included in the
experiment itself and that my anonymity will be maintained
at all times. I also understand that my participation in
this study is voluntary and that I may refuse to answer any
questions at any time. I also understand that I may
withdraw from this study at any time without penalty or
prejudice. I also understand that any questions I may have
regarding this study will be answered.
I understand that all the information collected in this

study will be treated as confidential with no details about
my responses released to anyone outside the research staff
without my separate and specific written consent.
I understand that I may derive no specific benefit from
participation in this study, except perhaps from feeling

that I have contributed to the development of psychological
knowledge.

I hereby allow this research group to publish the results of
this study in which I am participating, with the provision
that my name and/or other identifying information be
withheld.

This study is being conducted by psychology students under
the supervision of Dr. Robert Cramer, PS-211, extension
5576. I understand that if I have any questions or concerns

about the study or the informed consent process I may also
contact the Psychology Department Human Subjects Review
Board at CSUSB.

Participants Signature;

Date_

Participants Name (Printed)

'
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APPENDIX C

Instructions for Group 1

Experimenter Note:

(6 A+, 6 AX+, 6X+ Blocking group)
Practice Script

Read when worker(s) appear: "On the left side of the screen
will be a picture representing one part-time employee, Sam
or Joe, or two part-time employees Sam and Joe."

Read when the graph appears: "On the right side of the
screen is a graph depicting the company's monthly
productivity."
"Are there any questions?"

Have subjects press 1 to continue.
Note: A set of instructions appears for the subjects to
read. Read it aloud as the subjects follow along on the
computer.

"Following each monthly productivity report you will be
asked to rate the employees on their OVERALL performance on
a "0 to iOO" point scale. After reading each item carefully
please respond by using the numeric keypad on the right side
of the keyboard. After entering any number between "0 to
100" (including 100) please wait for the next evaluation
item to appear."
(Wait until screen changes to first evaluation item)

Read: "After reading the item for practice, please press 50
and wait for the next evaluation item to appear"
(Wait until screen changes to second evaluation item)
Read: "Please answer 111 for this item.

This is to

demonstrate what will happen if you enter a number over 100.

If this warning appears any time during the evaluation
cycle, put in the corrected number and wait for the next

screen to appear.

Please do not enter any number for the

last question during this practice session."
Note:

when you are ready to begin, please press 1.
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Appendix C (cont'd)
Instructions for Group 2

Experimenter Note:
(6 AX+, 6X+ Control group 2)

Practice Script
Read when worker(s)appear: "On the left side of the
screen will be a picture representing either two parttime employees, Sam and Joe or one part-time employee
Joe."

Read when the graph appears: "On the right side of the
screen is a graph depicting the company•s monthly
productivity."
"Are there any questions?"
Have subjects press 1 to continue.

Note: A set of instructions appears for the subjects to
read. Read it aloud as the subjects follow along on the
computer.

"Following each monthly productivity report you will be
asked to rate the employees on their OVERALL performance on
a "0 to 100" point scale. After reading each item carefully
please respond by using the numeric keypad on the right side
of the keyboard. After entering any number between "0 to
100" (including 100) please wait for the next evaluation
item to appear."
(Wait until screen changes to first evaluation item)

Read: "After reading the item for practice, please press 50
and wait for the next evaluation item to appear"
(Wait until screen changes to second evaluation item)
Read: "Please answer 111 for this item.

This is to

demonstrate what will happen if you enter a number over 100.
If this warning appears any time during the evaluation
cycle, put in the corrected number and wait for the next
screen to appear. Please do not enter any number for the
last question during this practice session."
Note:

When you are ready to begin, please press 1.
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Appendix C (cont'd)
Instructions for Group 3

Experimenter Note:
(6 B-, 6 AX+, 6 X+, control group 3)
Practice Script

Read when worker(s) appear: "On the left side of the screen
wiir be a picture representing part-time employees, Joe or
Ted or two part-time employees Sam and Joe."
Read when the graph appears:

"On the right side of the

screen is a graph depicting the company's monthly
productivity. During an evaluation cycle it is possible
a blank graph would appear when no report was required. If
this occurs it is important that you continue to rate the
employees on their OVERALL performance."
"Are there any questions?"

Have subjects press 1 to continue.
Note: A set of instructions appears for the subjects to
read. Read it aloud as the subjects follow along on the
computer.

"Following each monthly productivity report you will be
asked to rate the employees on their OVERALL performance on
a "0 to 100" point scale. After reading each item
carefully please respond by using the numeric keypad on the
right side of the keyboard. After entering any number
between "0 to 100" (including 100) please wait for the next
evaluation item to appear."

(Wait until screen changes to first evaluation item)
Read: "After reading the item for practice, please press 50
and wait for the next evaluation item to appear"
(Wait until screen changes to second evaluation item)
Read: "Please answer 111 for this item.

This is to

demonstrate what will happen if you enter a number over 100.
If this warning appears any time during the evaluation
cycle, put in the corrected number and wait for the next
screen to appear.

Please do not enter any number for the

last question during this practice session."
Note: When you are ready to begin, please press 1.
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APPENDIX D

Debriefing Statement

The present study is part of a series of research
projects designed to investigate human social causal
judgments. Unfortunately> in order to adequately investigate
this social phenomenon a small deception of the subjects was
necessary. Rather than directly asking questions concerning
your social causal judgments, we explained the study as

testing the efficiency of a computerized Employee Evaluation
System. The company, its employees, and the evaluation
system were fictitious. We apologize for this deception,
however if we had asked directly about your causal judgments
your responses may have been effected.

(Stop. Are there any questions?)

It is our sincere hope that the necessity for deception
is understood. It is important for the completion of this
study that you do not speak with other students on campus
about your experience here today. If other potential
subjects are aware of the purpose of the experiment, the
results of the study might be compromised.
The present study conforms to the ethical principles
established by the American Psychological Association. We
are interested in obtaining your comments or reaction
regarding your participation in our experiment. This
information would serve as a basis for checking and

evaluating the quality and care with which our research is
conducted. Please feel free to comment or ask questions. For
results concerning the present study contact Dr. Robert
Cramer, at (909) 880-5576.
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